Our guest is Ahmet Kuru, professor of Political Science at San Diego State University. We talked about his book, "Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison".
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Read the full transcript:
Hoshimov: Hello everyone. This is “Hoshimov Iqtisodiyoti” or “Hoshimov’s Economics” and I am Behzod. Today we have a very special guest. Our guest is a professor of political science at San Diego State University – Professor Ahmed Kuru. Welcome Professor.
Ahmed Kuru: Thanks for having me.
Hoshimov: Professor Ahmed Kuru is an author of a great book that I recommend everybody to read. I think this podcast will be mostly about this book. The book called (Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A global and historical compassion”. In the book professor, Ahmed Kuru talks about why when comparative world averages Muslims majority countries are of both authoritarian and undemocratic, but they also underdevelopment. Today I invited him to about this. Thanks for coming. Let me ask you the first question you’ll get to your book in the second. My first question is: How you thought about Huntington's book when you were writing your book?
Ahmed Kuru: Huntington was. He passed away. He was a very important figure in my career. Because I've had been making the job in my classes that I'm teaching is article Clash of civilizations. That he is the sheykh of my sheykh which means he is guru of my guru. Because my Ph.D. advisor was John McDowell and his PhD adviser was Samuel Huntington and John always asks me to be nice for Huntington when I criticize him to be balanced. That's one point personal and scholarly, of course. A big-name Huntington in 1950 civil mutilations than political modernization then democratization and finally Clash of civilizations. And unfortunately, this is his lease scholarly more controversial piece, but it's important to understand the mindset of many people, not only in the West but also in the East. Because I know many muslims who like, who love Huntington’s Clash of civilizations. Even I heard in China they love at some people because saying that: “Look we have a different civilization. We are not westerns, we are Muslims or we are Chinese”, but they don't understand the point that for Huntington all other civilizations are inferior and Muslims and Chinese are potential if not actual enemies. So in my book when I criticize essentialist approach to daily life you may call islamophobes or I call sometimes civilizations theory Huntington definitely as a scholar I refer to he was inspired by Bernard Louis a scholar of Ottoman history and generally present himself is cover of Islam. And in the famous article Clash of civilizations you may call it infamous Article only Huntington cite two sources one is Arnold Toynbee’s a famous book on civilizations and the other is Bernard Louis article “The rules of muslims rage”. So and I criticize both Louis and Huntington in my new “Islam” book.
Hoshimov: Okay. One thing, I read Huntington a different point in my life. I mean it is an important book. Recently when I discovered it Huntington’s book is the most read for college students in America. If you look some web-sides and check down” What science books are most in colleges?” Huntington’s book is one of those. And I think, I mean at least in optimistic terms that your book should be at least as important as Huntington’s book. If somebody read Huntington they also should read your book to understand the boundary of conditions, you and Huntington arguments. So in that sense do you think that Huntington’s book is so popular because it's kind of speaks to Bysisof of kind of consensus of a little that point or what is the reason of this incredible popularity when this book isn’t very well research? It looks like more reactional opinion for me. Why is it so popular?
Ahmed Kuru: First of all, you made my day by your very flattering and kind of books about my book. At least the hope that they coming back. Because Huntington's book even if it's had negative implications definitely mark and left a mark a very important contribution that many people site and refer to even if they criticize and an engagement it. It is important. And we were beginning of this interview I also emphasize I really wanted to have any interaction with Central Asian intellectuals and readers and this interview is very important for me. Because you mention that you publish with Uzbek subtitles and it is very important for me. Because I live in Ashkhabad and I have a deep interest in Central Asia and definitely Central is one of the reasons for me to analyze in my Islam book and it was also important for Huntington. Because in his article again, and then turned it into a book by dropping the question mark. In the article, the title was Clash of civilization’s question mark in the book there is no question mark. He was referring to three torn countries: Mexico, Russia, and Turkey. And for Turkey, he was saying that can Turkey go to Brooksville or Tashkent. He was saying that can Turkey be again part of European union or establish an alliance with the newly independent former Soviet Turkey or Central Asian republics. And then he said there's a torn country doesn't know where to go divided between Islamic and western’s identity. My take is very different. Because if you look at the preface where the beginning of my book and the dedication you see that I dedicate the book to my father who passed away fifteen years ago with an anecdote about him and I owe him very much to really read about this topic. He was grappling with the question of Muslim rise and decline of Muslim Civilization. But I also dedicate my book for to my sons. One is 13 other 7 years old and I said that they are both Muslim and Western. So therefore Huntington's notion of clash of civilizations that has no place in my family because I have children who are American. Time Turkish and it's great that in the United States. We have hyphenated identities in Turkish America. So then the second part of your question. Why did it become so popular? And definitely it is providing an alternative to the Cold War mentality what the same trajectory. Because when the Cold War ended between 1989 and 1991 there was a question to fill the vacuum and Fukuyama another says liberal democracy bone man Huntington can't with this notion to replace the American strategies instead of communist threats, you know how islamist threat, Islamo-Chinese threats in his formula divorce case for him is a dress versus the West if all other civilization 6-7 of them attacked the West is the worst one, but the more likely scenario is Muslim, Chinese corporation on the Alliance and you are right that since this really reveal the mindset of many American West and otherwise policymakers it became very popular. And look we have a huge Army in the United States half of a trillion dollar budgets and in about 8 to different countries of the United States have bases. And what would do this institution do without any strategic targets? So Huntington responding the critic says that United States always have some enemies to use the power, but now it has power with no enemy or any goal that I'm providing the goal. And let me conclude saying that ideas are important things, but they always need to be part of structures. If the conditions are right this nothing more powerful than a very timely idea.
And turning to my book on Islam, I think it's timely. Because for many year scholars and others follow Edward Said’s orientalism book, a very important book and almost the polar opposite of Huntington, but it has been overused misuse by the apologist of Islam and Muslim culture. They blame anyone who have a critical opinion as orientalist. And I face it myself too that they are two Polar Opposites. On the one hand that are Huntington an essentialist islamophobes, on the other hand there are post-colonial theorist. Those who use Edward Said orientalism book anyone with critical mind as an orientalist and racist or American spy or imposing commission agenda. So that's why I take on both sides saying that Huntington and others you are wrong that there's no Clash of civilization and Islam is not the culprit. But colonial, postmodern scholars you are wrong too. Because there really is a problem in the Muslim book 40 majority countries have a disproportionate level of authoritarianism and the development. We have to face this problem. We cannot simply go over deny in an apologetic way.
Hoshimov: Okay, since we came to the main idea of the book, right? So the book is built on this premise. I think well research premise that most of the Muslim majority countries 49 of them are both under develop and have poorly constructed political institutions because most of them are authoritarian or even those that are democratic or not very Democratic is you know; democracy and authoritarianism are dichotomous variable. You can be more or less Democratic and in that kind of spectrum, muslim-majority countries are on more of concentrate on the authoritarian side of things then on the Democratic side of things. So in this dichotomy one question that comes to mind I think naturally. Overall, do you think that part of underdevelopment story is explained by the political institutions or those two things under development and authoritarianism are somehow, you know uncorrelated? How would you think about that? Like does democracy called gross kind of question that's on try to ask as a first. Because society to literally in your argument as a Muslim country because of the variability develop that we'll get into in a second our have disposed to meet on underdeveloped an authoritarian. What I'm saying, maybe those two things are not really the consequences may be what is the cause of another or maybe not. So what's your take on that?
Ahmed Kuru: That's a great question. Thank you. And you know, there are three problems I start with in the book. One is violence. I drop it from the title. I didn't put it in the title. And in the first chapter I try to explain the readers that muslim don't have a specific exception problem of violence. Violence is human problem. And is a site United States it has the enormous violence capacity so are other Western countries, Russia and China said and exp. And I said what we see in the Muslim world is Terrorism, Civil War and internecine wars. I consequences of two problems authoritarianism and under development. Now you are asking me the relationship between too. On the one hand they are interconnected. But the real problem is underdeveloped.
Although authoritarianism has its own roots and reasons. For example, authoritarian Islamic or quasi Islamic make or islamist ideas preached by ulama - Islamic scholars, sometimes called the mullahs. The Sufis and sheikh who are supposed to be very tolerant, but they are not throughout the receiver tube with some exceptions and the islamist politicians mostly with again exceptions. And each of the three groups have exceptions. For example, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah in Indonesia are have ulamas with certain open-minded people. Sufie-sheikhs in Senegal have more open-minded sheikhs. Islamists like Rached Ghannouchi and al-Nahda in Tunisia contribute to democracy, but these are exceptions. Generally, a preach certain ideas with problems. Even if socio-economic under development and institutions problem are sold we still need to deal with these ideas. So therefore structure and ideas together or ideas and institutions together.
Authoritarianism has as some of roots related to sort for example ideas. Islamic ideas, quasi Islamic, Islamist are problematic, but seculars ideas are problematic to in most part of Muslim world. When secularist think about politics, state-society relations there are very authoritarian. And these are sort of the problem, but in addition to these ideas there are institutional structure of Eastern countries very much related to the problem of social-economy and under development. And in this point you are right, and if you really forced me to say something about that, I would say that the deeper problem is underdeveloped. Because under development is also related to the persistence of Islamican secular authoritarian ideas. So look if Afghanistan for example would be an 80-s country under this economic conditions it would produce an authoritarian atavism. If it was in Buddhist countries would produce authoritarian Buddhism because the socio-economic structure are very under-privileged. There are many problems and historically else I would say under development first because democracy is a new concept or institution. Some argue that here in the United States we have a democracy since 1960s after the Civil Rights Movement. Until the civil rights moment, we really didn't have a fully liberal democracy. Tis is an argument. Some argue that it happened after 1920s women's suffrage. Some argue that in early 80s only taxpayer’s property only slurping. So what I'm saying is that when you look at the problem of democracy worse communism, it is an issue of the last two centuries or three centuries, but under development is a bigger problem of a millennium. Because it's you may have developed authoritarian regime, I'll talk about it to attend, but in the case of Muslim countries initially between the 8th and 12th centuries, they had enormous Cutting Edge world renowne, achievements in philosophy and socio-economic development or science and socio-economic life. And if it had continued it would have it could help produce democracy, but it didn't contribute. Intellectual and socio-economic decline let to a certain level of decline in literacy, in industrialization and decline of urban life and it brings us to The Vicious Circle today. Let let me conclude saying that it is the Vicious Circle today. It produces each other but the bottom and historically long lasting problems on the under development. And the final thing if you let me continue is the comparison between East Asia and the Middle East. Because this is a big challenge I received. People say: “In your book you combine the problem of development with the problems of underdeveloped. It is authoritarianism. But look at China, look at East Asian countries. There are authoritarian but still achieving economic growth.” My answers to that is that first of all, we are not sure about China and others whether they will be long-lasting or not. Soviet Union was successful than decline. Second even in East Asia half of this sort of Asian Tigers became Democratic like South Korea, Taiwan and others in order to continue their path of development. This is one thing, but the second thing brief I want to say is that there are types of authoritarianism. In the Muslim world, in general as I tried to explain in my book authoritarianism state are rentier. Nowadays, mostly use oil rewounier where is in East Asia it is export-oriented productive authoritarian economic model. Second, in most Muslim countries authoritarian states are very military, especially in the Middle East today. Look at Turkey today. There is the foreign policy is always related to a milliliter attention now with many neighbors and exp. This is how an authoritarian regime survive and reproduce itself. What is in East Asia in the last 40-50 years, they achieve and economic interdependency with Circle less military emphasis tort. In the Muslim world authoritarianism are most most related to state clergy Alliance. I call it ulama state alines. Where is East Asia more secular. There's no problem of ulama in East Asia. In East Asia we know the numerical evaluations that government is very effective. That is certain level of meritocracy bureaucracy, not perfect, but better than Middle East. Effective governments which lacks in many Middle East countries and four and final, fifth and final East Asian Authority regime heavily invested in education from literacy, to 12 -education. They have very successful. That's not the case in Muslim world. And in comparative exam scores Muslim generally at the bottom is Asian Top therefore. Even if authoritarianism coexist with develop in East Asia is not the case in the Muslim worlds, especially in Middle East.
Hoshimov: I think this is a very illuminating answer. I mean overall if you look at the history of the world like Economic Development from very old time still almost 17th century the economic growth was meager, right? So it wasn't even like a percent century and then, something happened in the world living center has increased tremendously. And a lot of people especially economical historians argue that this is about values, this is about culture, this is about philosophy. And in your book you also talked a lot about philosophy and there's one idea that I really liked and I think there's a lot of rust, it can resonate with a lot of economic history ideas. You talked about Bourgeois and philosophers kind of Alliance, versus ulama and state Alliance. So before we get into the main kind of variable the ulama state Alliance, can you tell me why and how the Bourgeois values are important generally and why those virtual values or philosophers and the bourgeois corporation was helpful for Muslim civilization from the 8th-11th century. What kind of value is there? What is about this? You know Merchant class you talk about bourgeoisie talk about. Can you tell me more about those?
Ahmed Kuru: Thank you and let me very briefly start with the main argument in the book. For listeners who didn't have the chance to read or even see the book. So it's “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison” It’s global because in the first part present I tried to contextualize 49 Muslim majority countries in terms of problem violence or terrorism and underdevelopment. When I global comparison, not only with West but the rest of the world as I just said East Asia. In the second part is a historical comparison of two main things. One is comparing the Muslim world between 8th-11th middle centuries. Then the Muslim world after 11th middle centuries there's one comparison. Because I called those kind of
Golden age of philosophy and trade between 8th-11th centuries. Then certain level stagnation afterwards. Another comparison I am doing is comparing the Muslim world with West and Europe. And the argument is based on the relation between four classes. As I write your referred to there is the state authorities. They don't have to be simply king or queen but military aristocracy or military oligarchy like mamelukes. Or some bureaucrats like Nizam-ul-mulk in seljuk Empire. So States authorities, then the clergy and establish class of religious people called ulama and mullahs. And the third is the economic class. You can call them proto-bourgeoisie or the merchants. Then the fourth and last is intellectuals, maybe religious Scholars with independent mind and critical line not State servant or more secular philosophers polymaths, intellectuals. So these four classes at very different levels and mode of relationship in Western Europe and the Muslim World between 8th-11th centuries. In the Muslim world, as you said the merchants and and the scholars or intellectuals had a close cooperation. I cite an article of KOEN which brought us very important data between between 8th-11th middle centuries analyzing 3900 Islamic scholars ulama. 91% were private the funded only 9% receiving money from the states and is 91% had enormous level of variation, having Merchants themselves like Abu hanifa has silk merchants or a barber or a porter carrying things beadily. So therefore there was clearly a separation between religious and state authorities and close contact with the ulama, religious scholars and the merchants. Yes, at that time certain scholars like Ibn Sina, Beruni, Farabi receive state patronage, but they didn't become stage server in a way to justify State ideology, in a way to be socialized and produce in a state institution. No, they had certain level of interest based for interaction with State rulers without becoming today ulama types State servant. So that's Muslim world. Whereas in West and Europe from 8th-11th centuries there were the Catholic clergy, religious Authority and the state Authority dominating very little almost non-existence of intellectuals and the bourgeois.
Today some historians or social scientists claim to deny, they try to deny the fact that West and Europe was really inferior in comparison to the Muslim world. Because they assumed that since eventually West and Europe became dominant. It starts as Superior from the very beginning almost a linear progress, which is absolutely wrong. Because history does not follow any linear pets. There are always Cycles, zigzags, back and forth, rise and fall, increase and decline. In the Muslim world were superior to West and Europe, on mini-grants including for example City size. Bagdad was reportedly had between 500000 + 1 million population. In the ninth and tenth centuries when the biggest European city Palermo had only 20,000 people and the size of population city related to intellectual life because Muslims had libraries in Bagdad, Cairo and Kortoba. There are reports that the one in Cairo I had 2 million volumes. I think it's impossible to exaggeration. But let's say it 200,000 still wave bigger than a few hundred books in European monasteries. So this is class relations and results. Later on maybe we can elaborate elaborate in another question in the 11th century. There was the economic transformation from the market economy to more quote on quote semi-feudal “iqta” system of State control over economy a special lands and land distribution.
Second, there was militarization of the state structures, starting with the Ghaznavids, follow by Seljuks and after the Mongol invasions, the military model was regarded as the norm in the Ayubis against the Crusaders, then the mamelukes, then the Ottoman Safavia Mughal military base structures. Tort with the marginalization of merchants, then ulama need now a source of funding and then the state started to encourage the opening of politically-motivated madrasahs with the name of Nizam-Ul-Mulk the first opening madrasah Baghdad. They are then called generally Nizamia madrasahs starting in Central Asia, then Iran, Iraq, all the way Syria, Egypt and other parts of the Muslim world. Ottoman’s broad is model of “iqta” ot “tumar” system, “vakf” is landing system for the ulama’s mattresses, ulama’s state a lands to the Balkans and East Europe marginalizing the intellectuals and Merchants and favoring the ulama and madrasahs as almost having the Monopoly over the intellectual life. Even the term philosophers, philosophy became a very pejorative term, not to be used to again, weather in Europe the opposite transformation starting with the middle of 11th century again. There was an accident between the church and Holy Roman Emperor each side try to dominate each other and failed which create a balance of power. Under the circumstances universities and bourgeoisie started to emerge and intellectual class and the merchant class supporting each other becoming the engine off Renaissance, Printing Revolution. Then follow by the Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment and modern revolutions. You said in the 18th and 19th century that was the boom with industrialization, but the boom had roots. It is not an accident; it was well routed process. So there for the class relations was at the bottom of the transformation in both sides and almost the reverse positions in the Muslim world and West and Europe and concluding by your question: Why and how come this two classes of merchants and intellectuals support each other? In the Muslim world Abu-Khanifa the founder of first and important Muslim madhhab Islamic school of law – Hanafee. He was a silk Merchant and independent scholar stood up against the state authoritarianism. Therefore, he was imprisoned and killed. The example in Western Europe is the Medici family the bourgeois family who produced and supported many important names of Renaissance.
Hoshimov: I know a lot of historians may think of social scientists in the determinist, but like let me be the determinist for a second. Imagine flourishing economy like from 8th-11th centuries like the one in the Middle East and then something happens in the middle of the 11th century, which you call ulama States Alliance, but as far as I understand the point, it's very subtle. The first thing that happened it wasn't the Civic cooperation of Ulamas from the the state, but the predate that coopetition was that state started nationalizing economic assets, right? So, I think this theme is very close to me, because you know in the 1917 the Communistic revolution. The idea of it was to nationalize all the assets of people. People were lost their homes, lost their land and then the 1991 there was for example in Russia and other parts of the country they kind of get back to the circle one. Then after 2010 in Russia, I was cold and it still cold like mass nationalization facets, right? So the privatization that happened in 1991 was kind of reversed in the 2010. They took away “Yukos”, they took away other kind of oil and gas. Now the state power economically is again very, very strong save in Russia. So is that what happened in the 11th century meaning the state basically started to nationalize both of lads like agriculture, but also like trade rods and so on so, that the power of Merchants, economic activity shrink and then power of bureaucrats and economic activity increased and that was the cause of the coopetition or am I missing something?
Ahmed Kuru: Yes and no. Yes because you some rice very well and there are definitely comparisons that's what states are generally doing if no one stops them.
Hoshimov: Yes.
Ahmed Kuru: You know the jokes that they ask Pharaoh: “How you become so powerful? He said: “No one stops me”. Pharaoh in Egypt. So we have to stop and in the best in case the bourgeoisie was able to stop. The best examples are the cases of England, Dutch and Netherlands. They have stopped the state power.
Hoshimov: Do you mean like the Magna Carta?
Ahmed Kuru: No, no. I meant Glorious Revolution of 1688 so after which the property rights was really taken under the control of the British parliament's and then the English king accepted authority which really resulted. This is the argument of Douglas Nort and Daron Acemoğlu the Glorious civilization. So this is only one part of it.
There is the ideational part about the persistence of it. It’s very complex and very difficult process, because on the one hand as you said, there are structural economically institutional factors. The state becoming more military, the state controlling economy – the Muslim bourgeoisie was defeated by military States. Then the ulama became part of this structure was the ulama, were ulama willingly accept to be part it or were coopted by force.
This is very difficult. This is why to read my book. I always emphasized ulama State Alliance. They are two parts of the story. We cannot see the ulamas victim. There are not oppressing state and victimize ulama. They are together in this problem. And even in the case of Saudi Arabia, you see the king at the top using the wahhabi clergy, but the clergy game much influence. Even in the case of the Ottoman Empire, you may think that the sultan is a superior, but no. Ulama were part of the powers process. Because in many cases the ulama issue fatwa to replace the Salton. Remove the Salton by a janissary forse by ulama fatwa or justification. This is one side. The other side in some cases you think the ulama Supreme like the best example is Iran today. They have the mullahs, but still the state interest called the resume data, the purpose and meaning and then the interest of the state is very important in Iran. Even Khomeini said that man and state interests are needed the Islamic Republic can cancel Islamic religious worship duties and exp. That’s level of State importance recognized by ulama there are together. I think their life and teaching and writing of Ghazali is very crucial, not only today. If you search for any a book that shaped Muslims mind after the Quran and the Bukhari and Muslim’s hadiths will find most probably (книга Газали) of Imam Ghazali. “The revival of religious science” has written by him. This book has been translated to all Muslim languages, major ones. Shia has “Shia version”, because Shia has the most color wrote an adaptation of (книга Газали). Imam Ghazali is very important figure. Because on the one hand he was the ideologue of ulama state Alliance, that religion and state are twins: religion is the foundation, state is the guardian. The one without the foundation collapse, the one without the guardian perishes. Ghazali was a smart scholar and genius. He generally said he is the second most influential figure in Islamic history after the prophet himself. He didn’t call it in hadiths I recently just checked “что-то на каком-то языке - спросить” someone says. But after him this has been reported as an hadith. This is the problem. This idea became glorify as part of Islam, which is an infected Sasanids the idea pre-islamic Iranian thought. Ghazali contributed the Ulama state Alliance by attacking to targets of the Ulama State Alliance. One is philosophers. Ghazali wrote the famous book “Книга Газали” the inconsistencies of philosophers and the end of the book he said that philosophers are infidel for three reasons and they and their followers can be punished by death. This is a very notorious idea. Even today people may be defined apostate and kill and this idea really coming from Ghazali and Scholars like him. The second target was Ismaili Shia for political reasons. He wrote a very detailed critique of them and again issued a fatwa that they could be killed. This is one aspect of Ghazali and continuous impact until today.
The second aspect is that very interesting and let me conclude by this because directly answering your question. At the age of 40 he had a crisis. For Mystics, it was creature Crisis coming from God, but you can call it the midlife crisis here. He regretted that he served the states. Then he left the chair position in the University of let's say Madrasah. He went a two-year journey in Jerusalem, Makkah, Damascus when to the graveyard of prophet Abraham. He would never receive money from State authorities. He would never teach in a state based institution and he would never have close contact with State authorities. And basically we don't need to be anachronistic. They generally use the term Sultan sultanate, power, institute of State, Dovla is the later term used by Ottomans or sometimes they say Malik referring to Royal Authority.
But basically they refer what we say today stayed open. So this show that even Ghazali, even ideologue had a crisis at suspicions, has regrets that there is that much connection he had. Then he spent the rest of his life in mostly isolation. He established a personal Sufi Lodge in a madrasah to teach privately about decade and then only one year or so the state force him to come back. He went back to Nizamian madrasah for one or two years. That's it. Then even the main ideologue of this system knew that there was a problem and regretting his life. So then the answer to your question. One hand, of course, there is unforced them. If ulama today would say: ”Oh, we read Ahmed Kuru’s book and we hate to be Allience with State, we want Merchants as or new partners, state will intervene them by violence”. Certain ulama also enjoy the partnership because it provides them enormous level of power. It provides them monopoly to decide “What is right? What is wrong? What is Islam? What is not what can be taught what cannot? whether printing press can below or cannot?”. So this is a symbiotic relationship. But the original idea that Islam, Islamic ethics requires certain distance from political authority must preserve even at the time of Ghazali even today. This is this inconsistency. Even today you ask many scholars, of course, we should be distant from state. State is corrupt. There is this dilemma and contradiction.
Hoshimov: Let me ask you this question. I think a lot of people agree and right now this is a hot topic even in the US. One of the most important, development, critical junctures in the history of the world was the separation of the church from the state. Right? So it was happened in Europe. European leaders thought that church and state should be separate and there was a down the stream consequence even in the US Constitution, this idea isn't trying, right church and state should separate.
If you go out and read the Constitution, so probably every other Muslim country, Muslim majority country except for a few exceptions most of them actually do say that. I mean you put it in your book and I think Uzbekistan says that explicitly even, but if you look at the kind of de-facto how the state and don’t want to call a Church, but let's call it like a religious hierarchy how they work? You see that most of the say religious thinkers in those states are well within this state hierarchy of control, right? So there is almost known in Muslim majority country in which clergy operates independently of the state. So do you think that the fact that this is true like this empirical true that stated and church are together. Does not it mean that we didn't we as Muslims didn't actually process this idea that you know down State and religion should be separate. Do you think that main impediment for the development of Muslim Society?
Ahmad Kuru: Another great question. It is a problem, because the separation between different phases of life like religion, State, academia, economy, arts, sports is important for each of them to be autonomous have their own criteria of success and failures have their own dignity. If you for example calculate too much religious criteria for academic success, then you end up with nepotism and tribalism you use sectarianism and exp. for each of these Spheres independence autonomy is important for justice, fairness, productivity. And in the West, everywhere the clergies state Alliance has been the norm most of human history. Therefore, it was something really precious and important that Muslims achieved between 8th-11th centuries in terms of State clergy separation and it is also rare and precious what we say in the West and Europe and North America since the American and French revolutions. It's an exceptional thing very important, very helpful. And in the Muslim world as you said in my chapter out of 49 Muslim majority countries 22 have secular State, 13 of them explicitly say, this is a secular Republic, but in practice even in Turkey, it wasn't possible to release separate because of to two reasons. One historically there is this legacy of Ulama’s State Alliance, institutional, ideational. Second we don't have a theoretically consistent and deep analysis and claim. We, Muslims did not produce at John Locke with certain theory of Separation as he did at least in the pamphlet Toleration. We always have some top-down reforms like Ataturk, Jamal Abdul Nasser who was the military hero and try to change things. Authoritarian manner top down with very little theoretical, intellectual explanation understanding. I think this is the problem why or secular states are not really secular and there is still no theory of Separation, which is really necessary and needed.
Hoshimov: I see, when I read any book I'm trying to find an compromise sample so that I would know what is fearing him. So when I read your book and I also was trying to find an compromise example, and when I mean the idea not only about Islam, it's about any type of religion and state kind of Alliance. One Thing that kind of struck some my thinking was how does this work during the Soviet times? You know that the Russian Orthodox Church was as part of this hierarchy within Russian Empire. This was the case for Muslim clergy in Central Asia before Soviet Union, right? So the clergy was with the state the Orthodox Church was with the State and what happens is there's new Revolution which partly at least claims the idea of secular State and also claimed type of violence, violent atheism, right? People could be persecuted for their religious beliefs. Like if you are practicing Orthodox person, a Jew or Muslim in the Soviet system, you may be actually prosecuted under the law. Especially after the Civil War like after the 20s to almost 40s, having some kind of openly religious affiliation would get you trouble. And USA are that's the first time where the state willingly is breaking up with a religious authority like they're saying, all right. We so they made from the main Church in Moscow. They made a swimming pool, a lot of big mosques in Uzbekistan for example, we're turning to Warehouse, hospitals and you know anything, but not like a mosque. That kind of situation should make kind of produce the actual in fact de facto separation. And what happens curiously to my mind was that in the end of the 30s and beginning of the 40s the Soviet leadership which is again violently atheistic, they ride these memos about we should create a church and then they write about we should create a Muslim clergy and they do actually with a help of now what's called kind of a KGB. It was called by different names by the time, their ideological kind section creates this idea of how do we control the religion and then these memos they say, all right: “We have to have Orthodox Church, our church, we have to have their schools, we could control them, we produce the clerk's that we needed our and I'm quoting here that says that are Allince with the values of the communistic ideals. They want to create religions which are you know, how different is say Muslims from Orthodox and Jewish and so the Soviet kind of apparatchiks why creates and they do creators and right now in whatever to 2020 that is use created on like late Stalin era are still kind of persistent like Russian Orthodox church had had these leaders in their hierarchy from that time and I would say the same thing for Muslim clergy and Central Asia. They are well within the state hierarchies and so what I didn't understand was why on Earth estate like Soviet state, which is atheistic wants to go into the deal with clergy? Like this is the question that I don't have a clear answer to although it is illegal again and it's bad, but they still kind of pursuit. So what were how would you think about that?
It’s a very important example as if we think history in the laboratory, the Soviet example is very important. And first of all, it shows us the gap between theory and practice.
Ahmet Kuru: Everywhere theoretical ideals, goals had to adapt and follow the practical position in the real life and you can't impose your Utopia to the people.
And in that particular example, I think it happened under the conditions of the Second Word War Stalin needed to mobilize everything and he wanted to mobilize religion.
Because he was told and told himself that people are motivated by religion why I don't use that one too.
Even if we don't agree it is strategy and means in or and of defeating Nazi, Germany. And that's against in appeal to control the masses.
Because how would you control the masses religious leaders if you address them and then they addressed to the people who take religion servise.
It’s the way of governing for the states, even for Soviet Unions and so therefore it's a way of dealing the people who have long history of believing religious clergy and then following them. I think it's a very good example of this strategic governance.
Hoshimov: Okay, thank you. One I think more example; I don’t know how you thought about it. The new book DaronAgemogluand James Robinson the book called “Narrow Corridor”. They talked about kind of your idea in a way of state and ulamas Alliance in Arabian, Peninsula.
So in the beginning of 20th century, there is this I think the name of the chapter is something along those lines is like a deal between church and state. So there's so many examples of it throughout history in any kind of given Century like the 20 Century in the Arabian Peninsula and in late 20th century in Egypt for example, and so on.
One question again comes to my mind why the oppositional ideas, so you mentioned I think the brother of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and so on so forth. Why their wishes are not hurt. Why they're always kind of don't have an upper hand like why they always lose for 10th centuries in a row. What's happening?
Ahmed Kuru: Yeah. This is the million-dollar question. First of all, Agemoglu’sbook is very important and we will have him at in my San-Diego State university and I can ask him your question.
But in general, when we look at the Saudi or other examples of the the ulama state Alliance and how they persist we have to look at both dimensions again. This is what you asked, right? The persistence?
Hoshimov: Opposite force ever kind of got an upper hand. Like why did it happen?
Ahmed Kuru: This is a very big question. So first of all, as I said the certain level of connection between State clergy is the norm even in Western countries today, even member of EU, there are established churches: in Greece in Norway in several courts. Even in France it took very late 1905 to really separate the church and state. This is really a kind of normal thing with exceptions: we see in early Islamic history and West today. Second, this is not part of theological difference between Islam and Christianity. Because Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis referred to a gospel phrase “Render to Caesar what is Caesar’s”. But it's not that simple. Christianity always thought about this and it's not an issue of a fabricated hadiseseither.
So therefore I said Islam has its own experience of separation, but having said that today the established constructed understanding of Islam reproduces the Ulama and State Allience.
Many Muslims believe that it's the Islamic order. Therefore, this is very difficult to challenge when you do they call you the kaffir, infidels and apostates who deny teaching of Islam. So for example, when you look at Islam politics relations, very interestingly there are only two and half books you can find. One book Mavardi’s the 11th century half book. Third of book Gazali's book on “Kelam”.
Hoshimov: Can you repeat who is the author?
Ahmed Kuru: The first one is Mavardi. Mavardiis the author of one book “The ordinance of governments” who put the theory of Caliphate. He is the first and perhaps the only one.
Even Ibn Haldunin1377 three centuries after Marardi wrote his “Mukaddima”. He says I am not talking about the fikh or the Islamic jurisprudential aspects of the caliphate, if you want to learn go and read Mavardi. So this is the only source since the 11th century.
Ghazali in his “спроситеназваниекниги” “Moderation in Fate” just have a chapter on it repeating what Mavardi said mostly. Therefore, It's a half book. The second and only book is the 13th century or early 14th century Ibn Tania. “He wrote is the second book we know about Islamist political theory and caliphate and another thing. So what is the importance of Mavardi and Ibn Tania 11th century 14th century?
They looked at the Quran and find only one phrase that they can use to justify their theory. The phrase says: “Oh, you believers follow God, obey God and the prophet and those who have authority among you” and in Arabic it sounds “спросить” ulul amri min kun”. “Ulamo does who have authority”, but it opens to interpretation, you can say those who have wisdom, knowledge, expertise in terms of being authoritative.
But “Mavardi” used this referring to Kalif, there should be one leader, the leader justify everything else. Without the Kalif the marriages are not legal, without the Kalif courts no justification.
Hoshimov: how everything is changed
Ahmed Kuru: The others make it more open ended Ibn Kassir or others. If you look and ask (авторуточнитете) has a book about it “Looking different tafsir interpretations” it has not been consolidated until the 11th century. There were many Alternatives as I said referring to wisdom and exp. Mavardi made of the political authority Kalif, but three centuries later no more Kalif, because mongols destroy Abbasid caliphate and Ibn Tania wanted to justify mamluk’s regime. He said this verse referred to “Ulama and umara”. Ulama iswhat I call ulama and umara is our state authorities.
He basically said that the Ulamas state Alliance is order by this world, obey those who have authority. This is just one example of how they established a new Islam, a new understanding of Islam based Ulama and state.
Now they can’t tell you hadis if the prophet use this terminology Ulama and State. This is the way that really persist itself ideationaly. These ideas need to be challenge. So farnot challenge, because people are afraid. If you challenge they say you are not a good Muslim. You don't know and who are you? Are you part of Ulama? Do you speak Arabic? If I say, yes, I speak Arabic, then they ask “How many hadeses did you memorize?”. If you go and memorizehadis, they say: “Do you have a license frommadrasah?”. If you get the license they say “Do you have inspiration in your heart?” They don't let you talk about Islam.
This is the general understanding even the masses, not the elite Ulama the Muslim masses they always trust the history, believe in history.
You should give something from history, I can’t prefer to you, even if you are smart, knowledgeable person, you are not from history. They love history 11th century. So that's one part of you the answer.
Hoshimov: Yeah, that's a very deep question. Sorry for interaption Why is the Muslims are so hung up in history? I agree with you, but I don’t understand this.
Ahmed Kuru: This is very important. Okay, let me put it this way. Yeah, we will come back. Basically. Why is the persistent? Because religion is redefine based on Second, there are economic interests. “Iqta” system,“tumor” system, land today oil revenues. They share money, they share power. It is a very, strong powerful Allience, bourgeois and intellectuals have hard time to challenge. So this is the answer to persistent.
Now the answer about Al-banna. Abdul Razak in Egypt said by in Turkey the three figures who challenged Mavardi, who challenged Ibn Taimi. Who said: “No, Kalifis not necessary, Ulama and State Alliance is not part of Islam.” But these people became marginal. Why? Because on one hand the religious conservatives don't like them. They say:“Oh you are too much reform this, you can destroy Islam.” On the other hand,secularists don't like them.Иecause they seem to religious to secularists taste.
Ataturk, for example, use this seed by who gave an important seepage in Turkish Parliament to convince deputies to abolish the caliphate, then after Ataturk say “Youfeel your mission” then replace him as strangely secularists Minister of Justice. So being in the middle ground, makes people unhappy and I think my book also received.
Fierce critics of from both sides religious conservatives don't like. They saying: “Oh, this too critical”. Anti-religious don't like and saying: “What is this? Islam? Why are you talking about Islam in this time? It's an outdated thing.” I have friends saying me: “You’re a smart guy, why are you still studying Islam?” So to be in the middle really make you marginal.
Now your question about history. Because history is regarded secrets and the glorification of history is very deep today. The idea is that for example today you and I we are following or egoism. We are too much brainwashed by the West; we are too much action…
Hoshimov: Maybe you, but not me.
Ahmed Kuru: Ok, good for you. But millennium ago scholars were like Angels. No egoism, no appetite. Fully on the service of Allah and whatever they say Sagan. You know, this is the mentality on the vast majority at least a portion of Muslims. That's why they still live in history, because they think historical life was Godly. And today we live in a very secular, corrupt life.
Hoshimov: I see. Do you know thehistorian called John Malker? He's like economic historian Northwestern and Westand he has the book called “The culture of growth”. And I think that person to have a sanity has to read your book with John Malker’s book together. Because John Malker’s bookis an optimistic book. He talks mainly about, you know, this idea of questioning Authority, this idea of always be suspicious of ideas of authorities.
Very smart people always questioning them was basically a recipe for the Western development and you are saying the alliance and living in the history was a recipe for disaster in the Muslim world. I think reading them together kind of helps people to digest.
One thing I want to say is that this was the case of living history was very apparently persistent in Europe until almost 15th century. Even Christianity, the scholars before us were like Europe were regarded very cool.
And I think, for example, the European kind of philosophers who with the monasteries, who question for example, Aristotle or somebody like that were considered like weird like almost there is HazratAristotel. But some sort of reverence to the authority of people likeAristotel was kind of expected.
I think, Aristotel all of this great philosophers who are really smart, they had a lot of mistakes, right?Like modern physicists would know that you know, the you can divide atom, for example.
I think atom is in Greek means indivisible like even the definition was wrong. But you know, somebody who came up and said“The definition was wrong” was persecuted.
We all know the story of Giordano Bruno and Copernic and so one were opposite, so-called “status quo” were persecuted.
But what I don't understand is that why this glitch happened in Europe and as mathematician I have this deep feeling in our own want to share it with you. So I studied mathematics and underground and I studied in Singapore. One thing was studied very important about my classes that idea called “harmonic series”. “Harmonic series” are about convergence in math and science.
And the first guy who kind of thought about it is his name is NicolaKhorazma.
So he was a French mathematician philosopher and very kind of polymath, but he wasn’t in the monostry.He had a lot criticism and almost some people call him an opposite and so on, but he was the first one with the development
.
And why I read about this idea of quadratic equations and so exp. was Al-Khorazmi, who livedin Khohazmlike in modern Uzbekistan, which lived than 500 years before Nikola Khozrazma was not persecuted for his ideas.
He was able to actually write down the quadratic equation and think about complex numbers and so on.
But 500 years after Khorazmi, somebody in Italy and somebody in France were kind of persecuted. At that time, you know, if you can pride, you know “Oh my God, this is interesting for 500 years beforesomebody was writing it at nobody said anything”, but then if you think about it, I'm 2020 perspective, you're think like, “Wow, what went wrong? Why this kind of click in Europe and it kind of didn't click or I would say the click on got switched off and it was the Muslim world”.
I think this question is a billion-dollar question that you are kind of trying to persuade us about it. Sorry for the one comment.
Ahmed Kuru: Can I just say?
Behzod: Yes, of course. You're right John Makley is very important and he emphasized ideas I tried to bring two arguments. One argument about intellectuals and bourgeoisie try to make the combination. Second is optimism pessimism.
You can read my book in a bit optimistic way. Because the major dilemma in the Muslim world and where I was born in Turkey is that democracy development of Western concepts and people don't like to be really enforce Western model. But in my book I am asking aren’t all Muslims one piece? Participatory politics and development. Yes, then you have a model between 8-11-12 centuries.
This is the way to have a Renaissance with very genuine Muslim history. That's very I think optimistic. And the third thing about Khorezmiand others that has been too much emphasis on the Middle Easts, but Marshall Hodgson in his three-volume “Venture of islams” says look at Iran. Not other parts of the Arab Middle East,
but Frederick studies you interview recently saying look into Center Asia. And I think that's the missing point in many American and Western audience that Central Asia had a golden age with Khorezmi and Beruni,and Ibn Sina, and all of them.
And at the timeMuslims have deep self-respect and confidence. Today we don't have it. At that time,Khorezmitime, you said why not persecuted because Muslims have self-confidence. They pick whatever they see good. Paper! Oh, let's produce it. But then later on they became too. Maybe because of the main Mongol invasion and crusader, maybe because of the teaching of the ulama, maybe the state always makes scared of something.
Today there is the sense of being under stage and always losing or culture attitudes if we follow others good ways, but we have to have more self-confidence to learn from the West, the East and produce or synthesis. That's what or grand grand,grand fathers did. It is Millennium ago.
Hoshimov: Yeah, I think this is a trend this point andKhorezmi’sbiographies is that.
He was actually head of Bayt ul-hikmat in Bagdad right so. He grew up in Khoresmand Harun al-rashid I think took him to Bayt ul-hikmat and Bayt ul-hikmat was a place where people actually argued fiercely until the night by you know having a high pitch of volume with authorities and you know, like if you think about this way right now, you imagine a school of thought of philosophers where people argue that means there's no authority. So if there is an institution in which there is fierse arguments and debates that actually means that there is freedom of thought and there is progress, but one key aspect that you said about responsibility and self-confidence is also a question that always I was think about.
In many Muslim countries,Muslim majority countries, people, general population have this idea of State paternalism, like whatever bad thing they see, they want state to take after their. All right. This is not appropriate, you know idea persecuted like this is not appropriate clothing persecuted like your clothing maybe like inappropriately open, inappropriately clothes, whatever.
Like All this I feel like a lot of so muslim-majority countries have these societies that are so depend on state to take care of their inner being like somebody said ridiculously like, you know, we so much depend on state that, you know, if in my house it's too hot then I call the seat.
Why there is such paternalism in Muslum societies like I have no idea.
Ahmed Kuru: Great question. I think it's again remind me the ulama state Alliance as I said that state forced them, but later ulamalike it. Same for the people. State first forced them to be obedient, but now people are enjoying by not paying tax in many Muslim countries when I said there's a reaction it's all people pay tax, but compared with the United States, compared with Western Europe tax evasion I s almost the norm in many Muslim majority countries, we have the data about turkey and others that people generally find a way that's why for example in Turkey people.
The state is getting texts from oil putting 50% or so to oil products getting money out of the people or other way. So people always blame the states, never take the responsibility in general. We are talking about average in general.
Suppression became a way of enjoying by just not taking responsibility anymore, but it wasn't like that historically. Give me one example. Let me give an example of GazneviMahmoud. When Mahmoud was you ruling Balkh, which was a major Metropolitan Afghanistan at that time. The people of Balkh when the Karakhany army came, they fought against the Karakhany army and protect this city, which was normally ruled by Mahmoud of theGaznevi.
The Mahmoud came back and then people gathered around him. In order instead of appreciating the people he yelled them saying that: “Who are you the ordinary people? How can you fight. Whenever an army came here, if I am not here just surround there and obey. Otherwise there is a distraction and everything ordinary people have no right to fight. So this is the point of view of the military State looking us like children.
Not supposed to fight, not supposed to have what ibn Khaldun call asabiyyah, which means the group feeling, defending or position, fighting for it, having both negative liberty and positive liberty because negative liberty is to have your own space, but positive liberty is the ability to shape the public policy and state.
So there is a very famous britishpart scientists Joseph Needham. He spent half of his life to the question: why scientific revolution occurring Western Europe, but not in China and since then it has been called the Needham question. And he went China and produce volume about Chinese science. And at the end when he tried to formulate the answer he said that there is a painting about a city-state in Europe. How people of the city gained their armor and their weapons to protect the city against the aggressive as a community, as the people of the city not waiting for an army to protect them that was the separate of independence, autonomy, creativity, taking action and that's the basis of bourgeoisie Revolution, bourgeoisie in Europe. That's what was missing in China because the China became most state centric centralize,taking independence and creativity from individuals opposite of the decentralize Europe, bourgeoisieEurope, scientific Revival Europe people taking armies to defend themselves.
It reminds Gaznevi Mahmoud in Balkh asking people not to take army again. Otherwise, I would punish you he said. And the Ottoman Empire divided people in two groups. One is the Sultan, the ulama, the janissaries and the to our soldiers who are like the Guardians in Plato's Republic to all the states, at the same time were here weapon. The other ordinary People, no weapon, pay tax, don’t have anyInternational with politics.
So it’s very complex and le Okay. Thanks don't have any International politics. So it's very complex and let me conclude by Ibn Haldun in “Mukkadima”. He said: “Urban people are generallybecoming lazy, they have gates, they have homes, they have an army to protect them. Therefore, they lose their energy and self-defense. They became like children depending on the Army, but rural people do nomads have no gates, no castles. They live a life with challenge, every of them is ready to fight and they don't follow and Authority. Therefore, they have individual courage and they have this asabi, Asabia means group feeling solidarity despite the rural people namaz are more powerful than the urban people and then they general defeat them. So then combine all of them that in the Muslim world State, military State starting with Gaznavi Mahmud, then Seljucks, then Ottomans all the way today’s Authoritarian.
Ask people to obey, to be docile bodies, but this is a problem according to need them who says Europeans became successful because they have individual creativity, protecting their city.
Then China which a Central Empire asking people to obay deal and Ibn Haldun says:“But this is the difference between rural versus urban” and answering your question today: when a person today blame the state it reflect a thousand of year of State operation.
Now, it become solve well deeply rooted that it's regarded as normal, but state o-press individuals, individuals turn it into an advantage to blame the state and not taking responsibility for anything.
Hoshimov: Yeah, I have this a big, big trouble with it like If something inappropriate shows up in Uzbek TV, a lot of people write letters and discuss it and like try to threaten it or try to tell the authorities to ban it anddifferent types of angles. Like some conservatives think this is an appropriate, sometimes it's too conservative of show seculars think this is an appropriate. They all kind of try to fight on to what the content should be rather than like voting with their feet. Right? They have a right not to watch it for the little exercises. It's not only not I watch it, but other guys are watch it. I really want to kind of put the hand to our you know conversation which is tremendously of interest, but let me formulate one idea and you tell me whether I understood wrong or not?
So let's talk about State intervention into economy. I write a lot about it in Uzbek where you know in a country like Uzbekistanstate is everything in the complex. Most of the important assets is controlled by State, you lived enterprise and it is more extreme than Uzbekistan, but in the same country. Everything basically is controlled by the state, there is no personal action, but if you think about the state interventionfrom like Islamic point of view and here I come because I never studied kind of political ideas, I studied economic ideas. One case where Medina the city was attacked during the prophets time and prices in the cities, bazars increase. Because it's under the sea. There is no supply. People of Medina come to providences and says: “Can you talk to this Merchants? They are acting badly. There are selling things for really expensive price. And for which prophet allegedly response saying something along this idea. The idea was the prices is not regulated by me or anybody else. The prices come from like God and that's idea. And if you go and you know read Adam Smith, which happened, you know thousand years after, after, after that conversation that happened in Medina in 7th Century you read same idea.
Basically that the prices is a product of supply and demand and you know intervention does it have a solve the problem. And if you probably would regulate the prices it will be to Soviet Union where were deficit and the price is kind of actually help increase the supply.
So with this kind of theological base why in many Muslim societies even soon after the 11th century up until now the trade, the openness to communication and trade and regulating process became a such a warm interperated, like most of the time, especially after the 30s. The trick is within this Muslim country started to be controlled very fearusly. Even in like 12, 13, 14 century and became very extreme almost in successively. There was like no trade between Bukhara and Damascus. There was no trade,which is very weird. So I read your book and I understood as that mistake ulama Alliance that you described was interference of state to the little intellectual sphere and to the religious and spiritual sphere.
But also that same thing that kind of cause this decline was also States intervention into the economic sphere and that economic sphere may also have caused this Allience. So do I understand correctly like does my model makes sense or is it wrong?
Ahmed Kuru: It makes sense. Can I sit three things? First of all, you're right that they came to prophet asking to put a “narh” against speculation.“Narh”is Arabic says a “price”. Prophet put the prices. fix “narh”, avoid speculation. He said God puts the “narh”. It’s like Adam Smith, you are right. The second thing is that in the in the Muslim world the State generally after middle 11th century in the case of Ottoman especially was afraid of the merchant class. One reason is ideational that. The Muslims in Iran and Iraq in the 11-12 th centuries for various reasons became heavily influenced Sasanian ideas.
And I don't wanna blame Sasanian’s idea is bad, but even if you take neutrally this is the fact that Persian language in the 11th and 12th centuries became very influential, translations of works new written materials. And the notion of religious State Brotherhood was Sasanian idea, the notion of class structure according to the well-known Sasanian notion of class structure, the king and then clergy, then the farmers and then the last and despicable one is merchants.
That was some very negative perception of the merchants and you can see this again Mavardi in11th centures scholars and many others books. Some level of this regarding and undermining the merchants. This is Persian, Iranian Sasanian influence, but before that, before 11th century Muslims appreciate the merchants, because they prophet himself. And the “Umayyas” was established by a merchant family, but things change and after that time again, we can ask how come this notion became persisted, because of after the Mongol invasion, Mongols destroy many Urban irrigation systems turn, many areas.
I really created problems for merchants flourish again. So therefore the combination of Sasanian ideas, Mongols destruction and then the challenge coming from Europe and the major the Muslim Empire at that time the Ottomans.
You could assume Ottomans respond to dries of Dutch, British merchants to protect Ottoman infant industry and merchants. But Ottoman didn’t do that. They did opposite, they gave advantages to foreign merchants Europeans. Why did they do that? First Ottomans, very pragmatic. They regard their interaction with first Vernon's and Genovese Merchants as a division of labor.
They said: “We are a military employee. We are strong and powerful. Let's make the venetians and Genovese”. Later the Dutch, English and Italians other Italians do to Commerce that's their job and not nothing important. They didn't see the Strategic value of dominating the market, because they always wanted to dominate Battle field with a military strategy. Maybe they regarded arising possible rising emerging class as somehow challenging their Monopoly of power and then interestingly Ottomans wanted to support protester nations against their main enemy HubSpot, Catholic and all the Dutch and English and other protester Nations.
The economic mentality of Ottomans is called Provisionalism, which means as long as Istanbul and other Majors Ottoman Cities have food no starvation and with reasonable price it doesn't matter whether a European merchants or a Muslim merchants bring the food and other goods.
Ottomans did not understand mercantilism, that export-import, your merchants-other merchants, and then eventually Europeans dominate, entire Ottoman Empire markets. They use their military power to keep it because Ottomans, of course understood from certain level that they are losing economic grants is important. Muslims embrace this 11-12 Century Iranian economic mentality despicable Merchants. The last chance for them to really understand economics was even how to “Mukaddima” 1377 and it's a wonderful book on many grounds and I analyzing my book with many aspects and one aspects of Economics.
But unfortunately Ottomans when they translated Ibn Haldun’s“Mukaddima”to Turkish they didn’t look at the economic part. They only look at the part about rise and fall of Empires. Because they say “Oh, now Ottoman’s Empire is falling? What is Ibn Haldun telling us about the cycle of rise and fall”, but they didn't look at the economy. Because Ibn Haldun said: State intervention to economy create in effective markets. Rulers should avoid interrupting and controlling the economy. So this is all problem of the lack of economic theory.
Hoshimov: Yeah, this is this is great. I mean this part of the conversation that is something that I really think about. Even in Uzbekistan there's still like kind of I wouldn't say hatred but I think like pejorative to use of the word commerce and trade, but people think trade and commerce are pejorative and then the word we use is to kind of diminish them “olib-sotar”. It’s a pejorative word and Russian there's “torgash” and it was like a Soviet pejorative word.
But I think that your point that the Genovese and Venetian Commerce people who lived in the Galata Tower and place like that in Istanbul what actual wielding it tremendous power in the military and traded they were actually benefiting it and I think this Ricardo of Commerce and Merchant class by the by the Sultans and they're just like buyers and sellers having another control is like a deeply flawed and wrong thinking.
I know one thing about Turkish ideas, they kind of become very popular in Uzbekistan and I really want to hear your opinion about this. One of Turkish movie series, I think it’s about “Suleimans magnifiers”. The part of the movie is very popular in Uzbek internet. Hundreds of times I got it on my blog that people send me it. So imagine a justice person goes into bazar and he says:“How much is the, for example, bread for example, and then he says, you know one dollar or something. This is how much you buy at this point. He says I got in for 50 cent like and then this “qazi” or person of the Justice says hit him because he is he's wrong. Then they go to the next part and he takes the bread and then he puts it into the weight and then bread is like a lighter than something for example and then say: “Okay, you also get punishment”. So he goes to this and even reason to the market so and what he says that was a there's a lawby the sultan that says the mark-up shouldn't be more than 10% and if you are doing 100% work out because you are like taking away the Baraka from the from the Believers, you know table or whatever and then the bread also the weight the weight that the virtually saying and I think I mean As a modern-day viewer, I think what's wrong with it?
Like if you are buying it willingly and he says 1 kg, but it’s 500 gr then you can say “it’s bad”, because you lie. This video was so popular in Uzbekistan and people are saying:“You see how this Justice and in religion is where the state is controlling prices” and I'm saying, you know read religion like it's basically prohibited to Justice to to anybody. Go into the market and think about marcs, because this is basically like an important pillar of the religion where the price is not Control.
There is very few exceptions like the war and so on in which this can be justified in the very kind of limited cases, but this was a popular video and I was thinking why is so popular, you know, we lived in Soviet Union and the principal patron of our people are missing this Soviet Justice or whatever, but you know since talking with you and reading your book I'm saying no, this is not like in Uzbek problem or Turkish problem, this is more of like a Muslim problem in the way. We want the state to control her prices, to control our TV control, our books so we are so weak. If we read something in newspaper and we disagree with who have a bad opinion, so we want to make sure nobody reads it. So that that idea is very very interesting.
Ahmed Kuru: So let me begin with the first one. First of all interestingly in Turkish “alar-satar” say very similar in use the term in Turkish and I think the ulama generally take the credit for themselves as having depend for them referring the ulama. And only allow space to state having sort and in Ottoman system about your first question they were combination of sharia and konun.
That's why Suleyman is magnificent konuniy in Turkish the lawmaker. So some people this means Ottoman secularists, it's difficult to say secular because it's a religious class dominate legal system, but the ulama, the sultan to make law, justified. Because the Sultan has sort can really put and for every Sultan you have to sheikh-ul-islam in Ottoman system that Sultans generally replace them. But when you and I become deputies in a parliament and try to pass law the same ulema with exceptional say no:“You are Ordinary People, again off 2020 again, following your egos. You can’t make law.” So how come a Sultan is sort make law, but intellectuals or the bourgeoisie cannot make law? Because we don't have power to really Force ulema to give us the justification. Ulamas are smart.
They know what Sultan do to them by course. And in this condition merchants and bourgeoisie are weak, they never had the chance like the English bourgeoisie together an army and killed the king and push the church away that didn't happen in all history and then we there is this Continuous undermining of the merchants and the justice system when the Sultan decide to kill his brothers could Ulama interference say no never happened. When the sultan want to declare a war against Muslim states like the mumluks ulama always rubber stamp. When the sultan expropriated private property what does Ulama must say? That they say no? No, they were shut up. They were silent. The “Tanzimat” declaration 1939 tort the end Ottoman Empire declare finally 1939 that the Ottoman state recognized.
The life property and dignity honor of their subjects. They didn't say liberty. John Lock as life liberty property Ottomans says no, it is property life and honour. Until that time ulama never asked the Salton to respect private property. Therefore, it's not true. That there was a judicious system, over the romanticizing. If you look at today in the American and Western Academia, you see Arab intellectuals heavily being Palestine, but Palestinians are two percent among Arabs very few. Why are they producing so many intellectuals? They are like Jews because Jewish People have been persecuted. To that's why they produce important intellectuals and bourgeoisie persecution make them support each other focusing on philosophy and survival based on trade Etc. Palestinians similarly producing that and tatars I thinkof all Turkic or Central Asian people they persecuted first by the Russian avians and another, attack and then some systematic persecution of tatars in Astrakhan and other. Then they had the advantage of getting being the getting the knowledge of the West's than Europeans true Russian language and schools. So they learn some Western Europeans idea first before even some Ottoman intellectuals, but they were persecuted minority. Therefore they produce important Bourgeois an important affections and the Tatar intellectuals as you refer jadids Ismail Gaprinsly in Crimea and others, Yusuf Atchura and others from Kazan had direct yoIstambul Ottoman Empire, then they had a direct impact on Ankara after the foundation of Turkish Republic process.
Hoshimov: I see. Okay, interesting. Ahmed Kuru thank you for your time. It was a great conversation was too long and much longer than I thought it would be, but I think it will be interesting for a lot of people to listen. There will be you know, subtiteles here and also will be audio. So again, thank you for your time and our guest was Ahmed Kuru. He's the author of“Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment”. He's a professor of political science at San Diego State University and we talked mainly about his book and his ideas. Thank you.
Ahmed Kuru: Thank you. Thank you very much. My pleasure to have is very insightful conversation.